Maurice Merleau-Ponty's late work locates humans within a wild or brute being that sustains a synergy among life forms. His Nature lectures explored the philosophical implications of evolutionary biology and animal studies, and with The Visible and the Invisible describe a horizontal kinship between humans and other animals. This work offers a striking alternative to Heidegger's panicky insistence on an abyss between humans and other animals that Derrida questions but cannot seem to discard. For Merleau-Ponty, literary works probe the invisible realm of wildness that is our only environment, a realm full of language and meaningfully experienced by all animals.
speech are our particular ways of "singing the world." 5 For him, literary works probe the invisible realm of wildness that is our only environment, a realm that he saw as full of language and meaningfully experienced by all animals.
Strangely Merleau-Ponty is rarely mentioned by most participants in the recent spate of critical animal studies stimulated by Derrida's reevaluation of Heidegger's position 6 In these writings, only Donna Haraway, Matthew Calarco, and Cary Wolfe have seriously challenged
Derrida's resistance to the idea of biological continuism. Why might that be, when MerleauPonty's work so closely accords with much postmodern theory as well as with the concerns of present environmental and animal studies debates? Already in the 1950s he was moving beyond human exceptionism and seriously exploring the philosophical consequences of biological and ethological research. Taylor Carman and Mark Hansen believe one reason is that MerleauPonty's premature death prevented the full development of his philosophical project. They also suggest that his reputation fell victim to the radical spirit of 1968 which led a younger generation including Derrida, Lacan, and Foucault to lump Merleau-Ponty together with Husserl and Sartre and to accuse phenomenology of humanist focus on consciousness, or subjectivism.
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That charge could not have been made if his late writings and lectures had been wellknown. Not only did he reject that kind of focus on human consciousness, but his lifelong engagement with science took him well beyond the positions of other phenomenologists. 8 His 4 attitude toward scientific thought was not uncritical, however, for he believed it to be limited by objectivism and its failure to acknowledge its situatedness within culture. For him, "classical science is a form of perception which loses sight of its origins and believes itself complete;" 9 its theories and schematizations are "an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is." 10 But he also saw that scientists provided the most carefully regulated available attention to the natural world. All through his career he closely connected his arguments to relevant scientific research. In particular he relied upon Gestalt psychology and the disciplines of Alphonso Lingis describes the hundreds of bacteria inhabiting our mouths to neutralize plant toxins or those digesting the food in our intestines , 13 he is extending this point to recent discoveries about the genetic and cellular make-up of our bodies which came long after MerleauPonty's death but which show that the symbiotic intertwinings within each organism do indeed mirror those outside them. But Merleau-Ponty's concepts of écart and dehiscence account for distinctions among living creatures at the same time that there is kinship and continuism. The analogy he uses to explain this situation is that of our two hands both touching and being touched by each other, both parts of the same body but also distinct from each other. As it is with our two hands, so it is also between our conscious awareness of our body and its inaccessible inner thickness, between our movements and what we touch, and between us and other kindred creatures. This is a synergy of "overlapping and fission, identity and difference." From embryology, the lectures go on to consider Jakob Von Uexküll's innovative concept of the Umwelt, derived from careful scientific research on perception among many individual species, and then on to several ethologists studying animal appearance and formal mimicry. It culminates in a discussion of Konrad Lorenz's work on instinct. All along he is building a case for the profound interrelationship of creatures with their environments, from simple organisms to more and more complex ones, and finally to our own species and the appearance of our particular way of "being a body," 18 with its distinctive consciousness, or what has been called "spirit" in traditional philosophy. This reflective quality of our being has emerged over evolutionary time from the immanent logos or meaning of the biosphere, as it too has changed from earliest life forms three or four billion years ago. Our consciousness is thus part of the profound biological continuity we share with other animals, as in the type of "pre-culture"
Merleau-Ponty described in the behavior of crabs using shells of other creatures in a variety of ways, as we shall see below.
At the heart of the animality lectures lies the assertion that "animality is the logos of the anticipates the organism's future forms. 20 The axolotl lizard begins its life as a tadpole living in water and gradually develops legs and moves onto land to grow into a seven-inch long reptile.
At first it has no mobility but only muscles that can be excited locally by touch. At this stage its motor system has no connection with its sensory system. Then, as nervous system connections are made in the head, the organism can flex its head. From the head, the nervous system connections move down the body to the tail, allowing first a stage of curling or buckling the body from head to tail and then uncurling and flexing in the other direction. Next the tadpole begins to make an S curvature to one side, in a wavelike movement across the body like a zigzag.
When the animal makes several of these S movements from side to side, it is swimming. As embryonic development continues, anterior feet begin to emerge but function within this global swimming behavior of the trunk. Their form anticipates their future function before there is any musculature to make them work independently, though "sketches of motor fibers" begin to appear in the feet. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, "The leg emerges, absolutely subjugated by the trunk, then it battles for its freedom." 21 Coghill is famous for introducing the idea that because the embryo is integrated and has moving gills in the egg well before the nervous system appears, the nervous system "is not the last explanation," or the central place or governing director of movement. Merleau-Ponty believed that the importance commonly assumed for the brain and nervous system comes from the easy way it fits with mechanical descriptions of the body. But the first behavior of the animal is organized "under preneural gradients [chemical, electrical, of temperature, etc.] ; the nervous system emerges from a preneural dynamic." 22 In this way the developing embryo is a dynamic system in profound participatory response to its surroundings. Similarly, Gesell's work defines the animal body as "a take on the exterior world" whose organization is the same as behavior which is dynamically reciprocal with that world. In another example of an animal body developing in order to properly interact with that world, he describes the premature human child who has only a hesitant sleep that is difficult to distinguish from wakefulness, until organic development allows for the gradual development of two different behaviors that Merleau-Ponty explains are "reciprocal terms of a unique function. . . . " Earlier, Uexküll had posited a Bauplan or implicit intrinsic building plan for each organism, which anticipated such embryonic research. 26 He had described the functioning of organisms within the particular environments or Umwelten created in reciprocity between their own perceptive abilities and the situations in which they are immersed. For each animal or plant, the surrounding habitat is full of "meaning-factors" and "meaning carriers," things recognized in we postulate that what is, is possible. Darwinian thinking gives the actual world the power to dtermine the only possible.
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The result is a Just-So Story or a Panglossian conclusion that whatever is, is right.
As a powerful alternative to such a theory, Uexküll's Umwelt concept accounts for the active behavior of the animal defining its territory in concert with the soils and plants and other 27 Theory of Meaning, Nature, p. 175; further citations of this work will be given parenthetically in my text.
organisms in its community, thus co-creating its world. We might think of an ant building its anthill with its fellows, changing the aspect of the place around it and enlisting other organisms such as aphids in feeding its community. Or we might point to the North American example of beaver ecologies that determined the landscapes of lakes and wetlands in the upper Midwest before European colonization. Corals around the globe make similar profound contributions to the reef systems that become home to a myriad of other animals and plants.
Such phenomena are not merely physical for Merleau-Ponty but also constitute symbolic and cultural behavior. Operating within its own Umwelt, Merleau-Ponty explains, each animal 'defines its territory as a privileged emplacement' and functions in a symbolic realm. A crab, for example, can use a sea anemone to camouflage its shell and protect it from predators, or to replace its shell if it has been lost, or it can use the sea anemone as food. "The architecture of symbols that the animal brings from its side thus defines within Nature a species of preculture.
The Umwelt is less and less oriented toward a goal and more and more toward the interpretation of symbols" (176). This realm of meaning inheres in the relations among the parts of the organism, in the relations of the organism to its territory, and in the relations of animals among themselves, "so well that we no longer see where behavior begins and where mind ends"(178).
The implication of this research suggests that mind or consciousness has evolved or emerged from tacit beginnings over millions of years, into more and more reflexive abilities in animals.
"What is thus unfurled?" asks Merleau-Ponty. "What is the "subject" that Uexküll speaks of? The unfurling of the animal is like a pure wake that is related to no boat"(176). To answer this question, he reports Uexküll's explanation that a chain of events is unfurled from the egg to the chicken, and that it never becomes an object because its internal law never becomes visible to us. We see only momentary manifestations that are always in the process of changing or even disappearing as some new shape takes over. Essentially this is not the appearance of a new force, because the living creature works only with "physicochemical elements" in a spacial and temporal field where a "surging-forth of a privileged milieu" causes those elements to join according to unseen relations. Once this occurs, Merleau-Ponty says, "We can at this moment speak of an animal," which is "like a quiet force" regulating, making detours, preserving its own inertia as for example the planar worm does if it is cut in two, each part becoming a whole animal (177).
It would be difficult to find a more dramatic contrast between this sense of multiple, erased." For Merleau-Ponty, "The instinct is an activity established from within but that possesses a blindness and does not know its object." It is thus not adaptation but anticipation of a possible situation. 32 In a way it is "a tension that wants to find relief without knowing why" and thus does not aim at the real as much as at something imaginary; it is a kind of drama that is closely related to symbolism that in reproductive rituals becomes "a phenonemon of reciprocal expression" (196) (197) . Lorenz sees mating behavior as coming close to human language, and his conclusions lead Merleau-Ponty to say that "we can speak in a valid way of an animal culture." He died before he could go any further. But in fact, he had already implied the answer throughout the Animality lectures. In his discussion of the developing embryo's formal anticipation of its future, he described behavior as a principle immanent to the organism, dynamically and tacitly shaping its emergence. Similar to a dream, such a mode of knowledge is never self-conscious but is part of the relations among the parts of the organism, the relations of the organism to its milieu, and the relations among animals, constituting implicit meanings that emerge in "the higher animals" as instincts and various other kinds of consciousness. Given the way the discussion the Nature lectures move from embryonic development in lizards and humans to research on a variety of insects and mammals, we can infer that the evidence points to many 32 Nature, kinds of animal consciousness, not simply "an animal consciousness." The extent and explicitness of such consciousness would have to vary widely.
But in the last course focused on the human phenomenon that was the ultimate goal of Merleau-Ponty's investigations of science and evolution, a tinge of human exceptionalism appears. Here in the 1959-1960 lectures on "Nature and Logos: the Human Body," we find an occasional emphasis on "soul" or "spirit" that he seemed to claim as uniquely human. MerleauPonty asserts that "we are not animal," and he speaks also of the "strange anticipations or It seems reasonable to assume that in the Nature lectures Merleau-Ponty was still working out his thinking on the human place in the animal world and Nature more broadly, and that he would have eventually acknowledged the continuum of various kinds of consciousness emerging through the evolution of myriad animal species. Indeed, in a short radio presentation about animal life which he gave in 1948, he criticized traditional mechanistic theories about animals and said that nonhuman animals "proceed to trace in their environment, by the way that they behave or act, their very own vision of things" and thus manifest "a kind of interiority."
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The proliferation of animal studies in the decades since his death begins to show us in Typically, when a previously unknown communicative ability is discovered in an animal community, skeptics rush to discount its validity by detailing ways in which it differs from human language in complexity of syntax, creativity, or indication of independent agency. A classic example is the waggle dances of honeybees whose communicative functions were language. 37 Because he was raised among humans and surrounded by speech as young children are, he learned to understand spoken English and to respond using a keyboard of symbols. Kanzi can understand a complex range of sentence types and create statements of syntactic complexity and novelty to express his desires, his plans, memories and activities (64-69). He also talks to himself by using the keyboard with his back turned to human companions or by moving to a place where he thinks the symbols he is touching are not visible. Sometimes Savage-Rumbaugh could tell that he was thinking to himself about plans to misbehave which he later carried out (52). His ability to comprehend is similar to that of a two-and-a half-year-old human child, though his ability to produce language is limited by the number of symbols on his keyboard and the time it takes him to search among them to find what he wants to say (69, 73) . Even with the rich body of evidence such research has produced, some skeptics continue to deny genuine linguistic status even for Kanzi's abilities and those of other species like elephants, whales, and dolphins who have intricate communication systems that scientists are only just beginning to recognize or "hear."
We have to decide whether to define language in a narrow anthropocentric way or instead to define it more broadly to include complex communication systems of animals whose linguistic activities we are only beginning to understand. As Derrida said,
The idea according to which man is the only speaking being, in its traditional form or in its Heideggerian form, seems to me at once undisplaceable and highly problematic. Of not merely encompass it but mark it irreducibly from the inside, everything changes.
. . . And what I am proposing here should allow us to take into account scientific knowledge about the complexity of "animal languages," genetic coding, all forms of marking within which the so-called human language, as original as it might be, does not allow us to "cut" once and for all where we would like to cut . . . .
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It is easy to keep changing the definition of language to exclude modes not exactly like our own, but that practice is not very useful in view of what we are learning about other animals' remarkable communicative abilities. Nor does it help us account for how our particular primate branch developed its present array of languages between 100,000 and 50,000. Christine
Kenneally explains that after one hundred years of philosophical and scientific refusal to consider the evolution of language, the subject has recently opened up with discoveries in paleoarchaeology, cognitive neuroscience, evolutionary genetics, lingistics, and the kinds of animal studies we have been discussing. Interdisciplinary cooperation among these fields now supports the view that "human language lies on a continuum that includes other human abilities and the abilities of non-human animals" and that it took some six million years to co-evolve with and then differentiate from common mammalian traits. The core of Merleau-Ponty's lingistic philosophy appears as part of his work on embodiment in The Phenomenology of Perception. There he defined human speech as essentially gestural, part of our physical life rather than belonging to some disembodied activity of mind. Thought is therefore not the representation of some pre-existing idea but is constituted simultaneously with expression. In speaking and thinking we behave according to social laws we do not consciously know, "when our cultural store is put at the service of this unknown law, as our body suddenly lends itself to some new gesture in the formation of a habit." He insists that "The spoken word is a gesture, and its meaning, a world." 44 This is because "It is through my body that I understand other people, just as it is through my body that I perceive 'things.' The meaning of a gesture thus 'understood' is not behind it, it is intermingled with the structure of the world outlined by the gesture, . . ." 45 Speaking subjects share a common gestural world that has been established by previous acts of expression within the evolving biosphere. They are part of a dynamic cultural texture that has been passed on from one generation to another for thousands of years. 
